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L DEVELOPMENTS IN THE FIELD OF ACCOUNTING
A. FASB Seeks to Eliminate Pooling - But There is a Silver Lining
In September 1999, the Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB)
published an Exposure Draft, the centerpiece of which was a proposal to
eliminate the pooling-of-interests method of accounting for a business
combination. In a pooling, the acquired entity's assets and liabilities are not
revalued. Instead, they are recorded on the acquirer's financial statements at
their historical book values and, as a result, reported earnings are not
penalized by the need to amortize and depreciate the assets at the stepped-up-
basis characteristic of a purchase accounting transaction. Pooling, however,
carries with it certain onerous conditions and restrictions, most notably, the
acquirer must offer and issue solely voting common stock in the acquisition
and, if the acquirer has more than one class of common stock outstanding,
it must issue the majority class. Additionally, the acquirer may pay cash (or
other property) for less than 10 percent of the voting common stock of the
target, only if such cash is used to acquire the entire interest of one or more
target shareholders who wish to exchange their stock for stock in the
acquirer, or to pay cash in lieu of issuing fractional shares.
This ten percent basket is reduced pro tanto if, and to the extent that,
either corporation holds tainted treasury stock and to the extent of any inter-
Managing Director, Lehman Brothers, Inc.-New York.
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corporate investments. Neither corporation can have been a subsidiary, or
division of another corporation, at any time during the two-year period
preceding the initiation (the date on which the major terms of the plan,
including the exchange ratio, are publicly announced) of the pooling.
Furthermore, the corporation cannot have reacquired voting common stock
during the period beginning two years before such initiation. Such tainted
treasury stock, the presence of which can impede a pooling, includes shares
repurchased during the six month period following the pooling, and the
maximum number of shares contemplated by repurchase plans that are
announced before, and within six months after, the pooling. Accordingly,
neither corporation can have made certain changes in its voting common
stock equity interests (including, for example, unusual distributions and
accelerated vesting of options not contractually provided for in the option
arrangement at least two years prior to initiation) during the two- year
interval prior to initiating the pooling; the consideration must be completely
resolved at closing (no earn-outs or contingent share arrangements are
permissible), and the combined company may not intend or plan to dispose
of a significant part of the assets of any combining company during the two-
year period following consummation of the pooling. For this purpose, assets
representing 10 percent of revenues, operating income or assets (on either a
book or fair value basis) are regarded as significant and, as an additional
restriction, the gain from disposal may not exceed 10 percent of operating
income. IfFASB is successful in its efforts to eliminate pooling, the purchase
method of accounting would, by default, emerge as the sole option for
accounting for a business combination.
In such a purchase, where the acquirer's cost for the target's stock
exceeds the net fair market value of the latter's identifiable assets, both
tangible and intangible, the excess is characterized as goodwill. Under the
authority ofAPB No. 17, such goodwill must be amortized over the expected
period of benefit, but in no event more than 40 years. However, in a
purchase, to the extent the target's assets consist of assets used in research
and development activities, or consist of R & D projects in process, the
portion of the purchase price properly allocable to these items is, under the
authority of FASB Interpretation No. 4 (FIN 4), immediately charged as an
expense. The amount so allocated reduces the amount that would otherwise
be allocated to goodwill. FIN 4's somewhat counterintuitive approach
(assets with substantial value are, nonetheless, immediately written off) is
grounded in sound accounting theory. Purchased R & D should be, for
accounting purposes, treated in a manner equivalent to internal R & D,
which, as required by SFAS No. 2, is expensed as it is incurred. The
Exposure Draft, which concluded that pooling should be abolished, also
embodied certain changes to the purchase method. For example, the
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document concluded that identifiable intangible assets-items as diverse as
customer lists, subscriber lists, assembled work force, etc.-should generally
be amortized over periods not exceeding 20 years. However, longer
amortization periods would be countenanced in cases where, among other
things, the intangible asset produced identifiable cash flows expected to last
for more than 20 years.
In addition, an intangible asset would not have to be amortized at all if
there was an observable market for such intangible asset and it possessed an
indefinite useful life-a life the length of which could not be determined
with reasonable accuracy. With respect to goodwill, the residual intangible
asset, the document concluded that this item would also have to be
amortized over the expected benefit period, but such period could not exceed
20 years. On the plus side of the ledger, the Exposure Draft recommended
certain well-received alterations to the manner in which goodwill
amortization is presented. Thus, goodwill amortization would occupy a
separate line item on the face of the income statement, and this separate line
item would, itself, be preceded by a new entry entitled, "income before
goodwill amortization and extraordinary items." In each case, per share
amounts would be appended. Many observers concluded, without any overt
encouragement from FASB, that this latter item, popularly referred to as cash
earnings, signaled an acknowledgement by FASB that such cash earnings
constituted an appropriate means of evaluating a corporation's performance
and, with the imminent demise of pooling, the notion of cash earnings as the
principal measure of such performance gained some degree of traction.
Despite this silver lining in what was otherwise a decidedly unpopular
document, powerful forces began to line up in opposition to FASB's views.
In fact, legislation was introduced in the last session of Congress for the
purpose of completely derailing, or at least decelerating, FASB's efforts to
alter the ground rules for a :quisition accounting. These opponents argued
that FASB's proposed chai;ges would have a chilling effect on acquisition
activity, which should be encouraged-and that FASB's views on goodwill
amortization were not theoretically sound: Goodwill, it was argued, should
not be amortized at all, as this item is not a wasting asset. Since such an asset
typically appreciates, it would be not only misleading, but also unduly
punitive, to mandate that goodwill be amortized. Moreover, because a
corporation incurs deductible expenditures, such as for advertising, to ensure
that goodwill maintains its value, a requirement that it be amortized would
doubly penalize the entity's earnings. To its credit, FASB has heeded this
advice.
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B. Goodwill and Impairment
In a stunning reversal, the Board, in December 2000, decided that
purchased goodwill should not be amortized as proposed in the Exposure
Draft; rather it should be tested, episodically, for impairment. Goodwill
should be so tested when an event, or series of events, occurs, indicating that
the goodwill associated with a reporting unit might be impaired. Events that
would precipitate an impairment review would include: 1) a current period
loss coupled with a history of losses or a forecast of continuing losses, 2) a
decline in the market capitalization of an entity, to a level below the carrying
amount of its net assets, that is properly classified as other than temporary,
3) a significant, and other than temporary, decline in the market price of the
entity's common stock and a decline in its credit rating to a level below
investment grade. For this purpose, goodwill should be considered impaired
if the implied value of the reporting unit's goodwill is less than its carrying
amount. The implied value of goodwill, in turn, should be determined by
subtracting the fair value of the recognized net assets of the reporting unit
(excluding goodwill) from the fair value of the reporting unit. Thus, the
amount of the impairment loss would equal the difference between the
carrying amount and implied value of goodwill.
An impairment loss, once sustained, cannot be restored. Moreover, the
Board's decisions relating to the accounting for purchased goodwill would
apply not only to goodwill arising from acquisitions completed after the date
of issuance of the final Statement, but also to goodwill arising from
acquisitions completed before that date. The Statement, expected to be
issued in June 2001, would be effective for ensuing interim and annual
reporting periods. Early adoption would not be permitted nor would
retroactive application to prior period (interim or annual) financial
statements. However, in the period of adoption, and thereafter until the
Statement is fully implemented, net income, computed on a proforma, will
be required to be displayed for all periods presented.
For these purposes, an intangible asset should be recognized separately
from goodwill if, and only if, (1) control over the future economic benefits
of the asset results from contractual or other legal rights (regardless of
whether those rights are transferable), or (2) the asset is capable of being
separated or divided and sold, transferred, rented, or exchanged, either
individually or with a group of related assets, regardless of whether there is
an intent to do so or whether a market exists for that asset. An intangible
asset not meeting either of these separate recognition criteria should be
included in the amount recorded as goodwill. An acquired intangible asset,
recognized separately from goodwill, should be amortized over its useful
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economic life and should be reviewed for impairment in accordance with the
standards set forth in SFAS No. 121. The Board decided to eliminate the
presumption proposed in the Exposure Draft, an acquired intangible asset
(other than goodwill) has a useful economic life of 20 years or less. Further,
an acquired intangible asset, recognized separately from goodwill, with an
indefinitely useful economic life, should not be amortized, (regardless of
whether it has an observable market), until such time its life is determined
to be finite, if ever. Such an intangible asset should be recorded at the lower
of its carrying amount or fair value. This new approach has received virtually
unanimous approbation and, in the process, should go a long way towards
blunting the impact of the elimination ofpooling. In fact, most observers are
expressing the view that a purchase accounting model, in which goodwill
need not be amortized, compares quite favorably with a world in which
pooling is still an option. As indicated above, pooling, despite its obvious
benefits, has its drawbacks including restrictions on the entity's ability to
repurchase stock, dispose of unwanted assets and alter, even in the most
innocuous ways, its capital structure. It appears that FASB's business
combination proposal, as altered, will be adopted without serious opposition
from any of its many constituents.
IX. DEVELOPMENTS IN THE FIELD OF TAx
A. The Timber Group Effects a Morris Trust Transaction
The Timber Group, a wholly owned subsidiary of Georgia-Pacific,
whose performance is evidenced by a class of tracking stock issued by G-P,
will be distributed by G-P to the holders of such tracking stock, in exchange
for their stock. As part of the plan, The Timber Group will be merged with
and into Plum Creek Timber, a REIT. In the merger, the shareholders of
The Timber Group will receive more than 50 percent of the stock of Plum
Creek. This variety of transaction is known as a reverse Morris Trust
transaction; it is such a reverse Morris Trust transaction because the
separated entity, as opposed to the distributing parent, is the party to the
second step business combination.' If the parties obtain a ruling from the
I.R.S., and such a ruling is expected, the transaction will make tax history.
Historically, the I.R.S. did not permit a corporation that was the subject
of a spin-off, or split-off, to convert itself into, or merge with, a REIT. Such
a conversion or merger would cause the separation to run afoul of Section
355's active business requirement: To be tax-free, both the distributing and
I See Rev. Rul. 98-27.
104 UNIVERSITY OFMIAMI BUSINESS LAWREVIEW [Vol. 10:99
distributed corporations must, immediately after the separation, be engaged
in the active conduct of a trade or business, and such business must have
been actively conducted throughout the five year period ending on the date
of the separation, and such business must not have acquired, within that
interval, in a transaction in which gain or loss was recognized, in whole or in
part, and control of a corporation conducting such business must not have
been acquired by another corporation, in a wholly or partially taxable
transaction, within the five year period. In general, a trade or business is
actively conducted only if the corporation itself, through its employees,
directly performs, with respect to such trade or business, active and
substantial management and operational functions; the activities of
independent contractors are not considered. Historically, a REIT operated,
largely, through such independent contractors and, thus, was precluded from
directly performing the requisite management and operational activities and,
as a result, was not considered, by definition, engaged in the active conduct
of a trade or business. In the years that followed the publication of this
ruling, however, the REIT provisions of the tax code have evolved to the
point that a REIT is now permitted to directly perform a sufficient quantum
of management and operational activities such that it can be seen as actively
engaged in the conduct of its business-the expected ruling will confirm this
new view of a REIT's active business credentials and, in the process, open up
interesting possibilities for other corporations that want to explore a tax-
efficient separation of their real estate holdings from their operating
businesses.
B. Ford Engineers a Recapitalization
The Ford family possesses a class of super-voting stock that enables it to
control the corporation. However, if the number of shares owned dips
below certain specified levels, the family is constrained to forfeit a substantial
portion of its voting power. The family, however, had a need for liquidity
and the super-voting stock was certainly, for the reasons discussed, an
exceedingly poor candidate for such monetization.
To satisfy these pressing liquidity needs, the Ford Motor Co. engineered
a complex recapitalization in which shareholders were offered the
opportunity to exchange their existing holdings for packages of consideration
consisting, variously, of shares, cash and shares, or solely cash. The hope was
that the public would opt for the cash and stock, or solely cash, alternative,
2 See Rev. Rul. 73-234.
3 See Rev. Rul. 73-236.
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while the family would elect the stock alternative. The family would, in the
recapitalization, receive low-vote stock that it could deploy, through
monetization, to achieve its liquidity objectives and, at the same time, its
ownership of high-vote stock would not dip below the levels with respect to
which the family would suffer an irreparable loss of its voting privileges. The
plan worked as intended and, in the process, approximately $6.5 billion was
conveyed to the non-family shareholders who elected the cash and stock, or
cash, alternatives.
Had the company accomplished these goals through an outright
distribution of cash (to the public) and stock (to the family), the results, from
a tax viewpoint, would have been nothing short of disastrous: The
distribution of cash would have taxed as a dividend, at top marginal rates, and
the receipt of stock would also have been regarded as a taxable dividend.
Thus, Section 305(b)(2) provides that a distribution of stock is taxable if the
distribution has the result of a receipt of cash (or property) by some
shareholders and an increase in the proportionate equity interests of other
shareholders, the precise result that would have obtained with respect to such
an outright distribution.
However, by accomplishing this result through the mechanism of a
recapitalization, the parties were able to avoid these untoward tax results.
Thus, a recapitalization will be treated as a distribution to which Section 301
applies, a dividend, if, as here, (1) the proportionate equity interest of any
shareholder is increased, (2) as here, the distribution has the result described
in Section 305(b) and, unlike the instant case, (3) such recapitalization is
pursuant to a plan to increase, periodically, the proportionate equity interest
of any shareholder, or group of shareholders. More specifically, in Rev. Rul
86-25, the I.R.S. confirmed that a reshuffling of an entity's capital structure
will be respected as a recapitalization exchange, to which Section 305(b) does
not apply, so long as it has a bona fide business purpose and is not part of a
plan to increase, periodically, the proportionate equity interest of any
shareholder. Thus, the recapitalization, because it was an isolated
transaction, did not create, under Section 305(c), a constructive distribution
of stock to which Section 305(b) could apply. The family was able to obtain
additional stock in the company on a tax-free basis. Moreover, the
shareholders who elected cash, in whole or in part, obtained that cash on a
tax-favored capital gains basis. Such shareholders participated in a
transaction characterized as a recapitalization with boot. Thus, their realized
gains would be recognized, but in an amount not more than the boot.4
4 I.R.C. S 356(a)(1) (2000).
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The boot gain would be taxed as a dividend (to the extent of the
shareholder's ratable share of Ford's accumulated earnings and profits) if, and
only if, the exchange had the effect of the distribution of a dividend.'
However, the exchange did not have the proscribed effect and, hence, the
boot gain was taxed as a capital gain. In single-entity reorganizations,
applying the principles of Section 302, dealing with stock redemptions,
makes the determination of whether the exchange has the proscribed effect.6
In each case, a hypothetical redemption would qualify for sale or exchange
(rather than distribution) treatment because the exchanging shareholder
suffered a sufficient reduction in his or her proportionate interest in the
corporation.7 Accordingly, those who opted for cash extracted such cash on
a capital gains basis. The moral of the Ford story, a highly tax-efficient
transaction, is this: Where the goal is to shift equity interests inter se, that
objective should be accomplished not tlirough an outright distribution of
cash to some shareholders and equity to others but, instead, through an
isolated recapitalization.
C. Will Chris-Craft's Merger Constitute a Reorganization?
Not long ago, Chris-Craft announced it had reached an agreement in
which it, along with its majority-owned subsidiaries, would be merged into
an affiliate of News Corporation. The consideration consists of a mix of
NWS ordinary shares and cash in proportions designed to insure that the
merger will meet the continuity of interest requirement necessary for a
merger to qualify as a reorganization (some 70 percent of the aggregate
consideration will consist of equity, an amount sufficient to insure that a
substantial part of the value of the target's proprietary interests will be
preserved in the transaction; most observers believe that, to meet this
requirement, as little as 40 percent of the consideration need be comprised
of equity). Nevertheless, the parties are not certain that the transaction, as
structured, will qualify as a reorganization and they are taking the unusual
step, in the event reorganization status is not available, of reserving the right
to restructure the deal (it will take the form of a reverse subsidiary merger)
and, if the right to restructure is elected, the acquisition price will be
increased to take account of the fact that the restructured transaction, because
it cannot qualify as a reorganization under Section 368(a)(2)(E), will be fully
taxable to the CCN shareholders. Why the uncertainty?
s See I.R.C. S 356(a)(2) (2000).
6 See Rev. Rul. 84-114.
7 See I.R.C. S 302(b)(1) (2000).
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The merger, if not restructured, will take the form of a forward
triangular merger in which CCN and its affiliates will be merged into a
newly created, first-tier, domestic subsidiary of News Corp. Such a
triangular merger qualifies as a reorganization, under Section 368(a)(2)(D),
as long as the subsidiary acquires substantially all of the target's assets, no
stock of the subsidiary is used to compensate the target's shareholders, and
the general reorganization requirements (continuity of interest, continuity
of business enterprise and business purpose) are complied with.' The
acquired assets can be transferred to a subsidiary of the acquiring corporation
without disqualifying the reorganization. 9 In fact, under Reg. Section 1.368-
2(k), a transaction, otherwise qualifying as a reorganization, shall not be
disqualified by reason of the fact that all or part of the acquired assets are
transferred to corporations controlled, within the meaning of Section 368(c),
in each transfer, by the transferor. Thus, it is clear that acquired assets can
be transferred, vertically, to lower-tier subsidiaries of the acquirer, so long as
each such transferee is an 80 percent or greater subsidiary of the corporation
conveying the acquired assets. Here, however, the acquired assets will
ultimately come to rest in Fox Entertainment Group (FEG). However, FEG
is not a subsidiary of the acquiring corporation. The regulations, moreover,
do not explicitly -provide for lateral or diagonal transfers of acquired assets
because a sister corporation (FEG) is not controlled, within the meaning of
Section 368(c), by its brother corporation even though both are, ultimately,
controlled by the same parent (News Corp.). Section 368(c) defines control
in terms of direct ownership of stock and not in terms of practical control.'0
Thus, it appears that the parties are, prudently, planning for the possibility
of an adverse decision on this transaction's claim to reorganization status.
Clearly, yet inexplicably, the post-acquisition asset transfers envisioned by
News Corp. are not expressly permitted by the regulations and, although
they may meet the spirit of the I.R.S.'s commitment to eliminate the doctrine
of remote continuity, the I.R.S. may feel no compulsion to, effectively,
expand its regulations and permit other than vertical asset transfers.
D. Tangential Acquisition Costs are Deductible
The battle over the proper scope of the Indopco, Inc. v. Commissioner"
decision rages still. In that case, the Supreme Court held that expenses
incurred by a target, in connection with a friendly acquisition (the expenses
8 See Rev. Rul. 74-297.
9 See Rev. Rul. 72-576.
1o See Rev. Rul. 56-613.
11 Indopco, Inc. v. Comm'r, 503 U.S. 79 (1992).
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there were for a fairness opinion rendered by the target's investment banker
and for legal services performed by such target's outside counsel), were non-
deductible capital expenditures because the acquisition resulted in long-term
benefits to the target. Significantly, the Court rejected the argument, derived
from its Commissioner v. Lincoln Savings & Loan 2 decision, that the expenses
were deductible, by definition, because they did not result in the creation or
enhancement ofa separate and distinct additional asset. The Indopco decision,
because of its breadth, emboldened the I.R.S. to the point where many
heretofore deductible expenses that, as virtually all expenses do, have some
future benefit aspect were subjected to its scrutiny and, in many cases, the
I.R.S. asserted that these expenses ought to be considered capital
expenditures.
The lower courts, however, have begun to restrict the I.R.S.'s expansive
approach to the question of the nature of an expenditure and, recently, in the
PNC Bancorp v. Commissioner case, rejected its attempt to require the
capitalization of loan origination expenses incurred by a bank in the ordinary
course of its business. Now, as a result of the Eighth's Circuit reversal of the
Tax Court's decision in Wells Fargo v. Commissioner,4 additional limits will be
placed on the I.R.S.'s heretofore-unrestrained enthusiasm for disallowing the
deduction of expenses.
In Wells Fargo, Norwest (a predecessor of Wells Fargo) and a prospective
target commenced discussions. Later, as these discussions proved to be
amicable, an Agreement and Plan of Reorganization was entered into-its
effectiveness was subject to both shareholder and regulatory approval of the
transaction. These approvals were secured and, eventually, the target became
a wholly owned subsidiary of Norwest. At issue was the deductibility of
certain legal fees and officers' salaries the target had paid.
The legal fees related to services performed concerning Norwest's due
diligence review and, as well, about investigating whether Norwest's director
and officer liability coverage would protect the target's directors and officers.
The target's officers worked on various aspects of the transaction and the
I.R.S. sought to disallow as deductions (along with the legal fees) their
salaries attributable to services performed with respect to the transaction. Re
Rev. Rul. 73-580, a pronouncement that pre-dates Indopco, foreshadowed this
latter disallowance, where the I.R.S. concluded that the portion of an
executive's salary attributable to work performed in connection with
consummated acquisitions would be capital in nature.
12 Comm'r v. Lincoln Say. & Loan Ass'n., 403 U.S. 345 (1971).
13 PNC Bancorp. Inc. v. Comm'r, 212 F.3d 822 (3d Cir. 2000).
14 Wells Fargo & Co. v. Comm'r, 224 F.3d 874 (8th Cir. 2000).
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The Eighth Circuit, with respect to the issue of whether a portion of
such salaries should be capitalized, summarily rejected the Service's
argument. It held that it is not proper to decide that a cost must be
capitalized solely because the cost is incidentally connected with a long-term
benefit (here, the acquisition transaction). Indopco amply supported this
approach; the Court stated that the mere presence of an incidental future
benefit might not warrant capitalization.
Indopco, the court pointed out, addressed costs which were directly
related to the acquisition and, by contrast, the instant case involved costs
which were (only) indirectly related thereto: There was only an indirect
relation between the salaries (which originated from an employment
relationship) and the acquisition and such indirect relationship was
evidenced by the fact that: 1) there was no increase in the executives' salaries
attributable to the acquisition, and that 2) they would have been paid such
salaries whether or not the acquisition took place. Accordingly, the rationale
of Rev. Rul. 73-580 was soundly rejected and the salaries were ruled to be
fully deductible.
With respect to the legal fees, the taxpayer was less successful. The court
agreed with the I.R.S.-and the position the agency adopted in Rev. Rul. 99-
23-chat investigatory expenses, which pre-date the final decision to acquire,
ought to be capitalized. Here, that final decision date was the date on which
the parties entered the Agreement and Plan of Reorganization and, since the
fees were incurred after that date, they were subject to capitalization.
Nevertheless, as indicated in Rev. Rul. 99-23, (which deals with the question
of when such investigatory costs are start-up costs eligible, under Section
195, for 60 month amortization), the I.R.S. usually takes a narrower view of
when the final decision to acquire is reached. Accordingly, even this aspect
of the case is positive since it stands for the proposition that the date of final
decision is later in the process than originally thought with the result that a
larger quantity of these investigatory expenses will fall within the beneficial
start-up expense category.
E. I.R.S. Further Eases the Continuity of Interest Requirement
Section 368(a)(1)(A) of the tax code provides that a statutory merger (or
consolidation) will qualify as a tax-free reorganization. Oddly, the statute
itself places no restrictions on the type of consideration that may be used so
that an exchange may qualify as a reorganization--even if money changes
hands-as long as a judicial doctrine, that was created to distinguish
reorganizations from taxable sales, the doctrine of continuity of interest, is
satisfied. Thus, according to the courts, the term, reorganization,
presupposes a continuance of interest on the part of the former shareholders
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of the acquired corporation in the properties transferred by such acquired
entity.
Specifically, continuity of interest requires that a substantial part of the
value of the proprietary interests in the target be preserved in the potential
reorganization.' s For this purpose, a proprietary interest is preserved if it is
exchanged for a proprietary interest in the issuing corporation. Conversely,
a proprietary interest is not so preserved (so it detracts from continuity of
interest) if it is acquired by the issuing corporation for consideration other
than stock, or where, in connection with the reorganization, stock of the
target is redeemed by the target or where, in connection with the potential
reorganization, stock of the issuing corporation, furnished in exchange for a
proprietary interest in the target, is repurchased by such issuing corporation
(or by a related person).
The modern version of the continuity of interest rules, which was
promulgated in 1998, provides that a mere disposition of stock of the target
(prior to the reorganization), to persons not related to the target or the
issuing corporation, is disregarded, as is a mere disposition of stock of the
issuing corporation (received in the reorganization) to persons not related to
such issuing corporation. These major concessions, on the I.R.S.'s part,
eliminated the notions of historical shareholder continuity-under which
only stock received by the historical shareholders of the target counted for
continuity purposes-as well as post-merger continuity under which a pre-
conceived plan or arrangement to dispose of stock could cause that stock to
be excluded in the computation of continuing equity. 6 Thus, except in the
case of a repurchase of stock, before or after the merger, that is found to have
been undertaken in connection with such merger, continuity now focuses
solely on the quality of consideration furnished in the merger exchange,
without regard to whom it is furnished (historical shareholder or otherwise),
and without regard to what those persons, to whom the consideration is
furnished, do with it once it is received.
In addition, as some recent pronouncements demonstrate, the I.R.S. is
not taking a hard line with respect to the question of when redemption is
undertaken concerning the reorganization. Thus, in Rev. Rul. 99-58, a
corporation with a pre-existing stock repurchase program acquired another
corporation in a merger. To prevent dilution, it modified the repurchase
program such that it would now repurchase an amount of its stock equivalent
to the amount it issued in the merger. The I.R.S., graciously, ruled that the
repurchases would not be seen as in connection with the reorganization and,
15 See Reg. Section 1.368-1(e).
16 Cf. Rev. Rul. 66-23.
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hence, would not detract from continuity of interest. The redemptions were
not disruptive because there was no understanding between the issuing
corporation and the target shareholders that their ownership would be
transitory and because the repurchases would be made on the open market,
and thus the identities of the sellers of the stock would be unknown, the
repurchase program did not favor participation by the former target
shareholders. Thus, except in rare and extraordinary circumstances, post-
merger buybacks will not detract from continuity of interest.
Now, with the promulgation of Reg. Section 1.368-1 (e) (1) (ii), the same
can be said of pre-merger stock buybacks (and extraordinary distributions)
effected by the target. These regulations provide that a proprietary interest
in the target is not preserved (so that continuity of interest is adversely
affected) if consideration received prior to the merger (by the target
shareholders), either in redemption or in a distribution with respect to stock
(i.e., a special dividend), is treated as other property for purposes of Section
356. This reference to Section 356, confirmed by the example embodied in
the regulations, indicates, happily, that the I.R.S. has taken an exceedingly
narrow view of when a pre-merger redemption (and/or special dividend) will
be seen as in connection with a merger. Thus, in the example, a corporation
(T) had two shareholders, Mr. A and Ms. B. An unrelated corporation, (P)
desired to acquire T in a merger in which the sole consideration would be P
stock. However, Ms. B had no interest in owning P stock and, to facilitate
the merger, T redeemed all of Ms. B's stock in T immediately before the
merger. If one employs the conventional meaning of the term, it would
certainly appear that the buybackwas in connection with the ensuing merger.
However, because of the reference to Section 356, the example concludes
that the buyback was not in connection with the merger and, hence, did not
adversely affect continuity of interest. This was because P provided no funds
with respect to the buyback, which was apparently financed with T's own
assets or, perhaps, with loan proceeds that were obtained solely on the
strength of T's own credit capacity. Thus, except to the extent that the
issuing corporation participates in the buyback, through a direct or indirect
provision of funds therefore, a pre-merger buyback (and/or special dividend)
will not detract from continuity of interest.
In this regard, Rev. Rul. 75-360 illustrates the type of participation that
would conflict with these rules. There, immediately before an attempted 'B'
reorganization, the target borrowed funds for redeeming a portion of its
outstanding stock. The share for share exchange ensued and, almost
immediately thereafter, the acquiring corporation contributed funds to the
target to enable the latter to defray the buyback indebtedness. Since, in
substance, the funds to accomplish the buyback were actually furnished by
the acquirer, the transaction was found to violate the solely for voting stock
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condition necessary for a 'B' reorganization and the overall transaction was
viewed, simply, as a taxable sale or exchange.' Undoubtedly, a similar set of
facts, played out in the context of a merger, would, even under the newly
liberalized rules, call the transaction's claim to the requisite continuity of
interest into question. A more difficult question would arise in cases where
the acquirer does not contribute capital to a recently acquired target-to
enable it to defray the buyback indebtedness-but, merely, guarantees such
indebtedness for the purpose of lowering the target's borrowing costs.
Should this involvement in the buyback process be considered a provision
of funds by the acquirer such that the buyback detracts from continuity of
interest? The answer would appear to be no but the regulatory example does
not definitively answer the question. Nevertheless, these latest regulations,
when combined with the stance the I.R.S. adopted in Rev. Rul. 99-58,
certainly diminishes the odds that a stock buyback, whether occurring before
or after a merger, will cause such merger to run afoul of the venerable
continuity of interest rule.
F. Spin-Offs Preceded by a Control Gathering Recapitalization
When a corporation owns an appreciated equity stake in another
corporation, which does not, however, represent a controlling interest, a
spin-off of that stake is still possible, but only if certain preliminary steps are
taken. These steps, which feature a recapitalization, are designed to place the
distributing entity in control of the investee such that the stake can then be
distributed on a tax-efficient basis."8
For this purpose, control means the ownership of stock possessing at
least 80 percent of the total combined voting power of all classes of stock
entitled to vote (voting power is generally measured by a class' relative ability
to elect directors)' 9 and at least 80 percent of the total number of shares of
each class (if any) of non-voting stock.21 It is important to note that the
control definition does not require the ownership of any particular
percentage of the value of the investee's stock. Thus, control can be rather
easily attained if the investee is willing to alter its capital structure through
the creation of both a high vote and low vote class of stock. If it is so willing,
the parent can then swap its existing stock for the newly created class of high
vote stock, and if such stock possesses the requisite percentage of the voting
17 See also Rev. Rut. 75-493.
18 For a spin-off to be tax-free, the distributing corporation must, immediately before such spin-
off, be in control of the corporation whose shares and securities it is distributing.
19 Rev. Rut. 84-6.
M See I.R.C. S 368(c) (2000) and Rev. Rut. 59-259.
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power of the outstanding stock, the parent has gained control of the investee.
At this point, the parent is positioned to distribute that stock on a tax-free
basis because such control (although acquired within the five year period
preceding the spin-off) has been attained in a permissible manner, that is, via
a wholly tax-free transaction, the recapitalization exchange."
LTR 200048030 appears to address St. Joe's spin-offofFlorida East Coast
Industries. Such spin-off will be undertaken for compelling business
reasons; separating Florida East Coast from St. Joe would enable the latter to
increase its borrowing capacity and, in the process, enable it borrow on better
terms. These better terms would include a lower interest rate on St. Joe's
borrowings. The cost savings to be realized would be substantial, within the
meaning of Rev. Proc. 96-30, because they would exceed one percent of the
base period net income of the St. Joe group (the group's net consolidated
financial income) for the three-year period preceding the separation. Since,
however, St. Joe did not possess a controlling interest in Florida East Coast,
the spin-off was preceded by the type of recapitalization referred to above.
In this case, the holders of the high vote stock would, unequivocally, possess
a controlling interest in the issuer because such holders, in the aggregate, are
entitled to elect exactly 80 percent of the members of the issuer's board of
directors.
22
Among the drawbacks of operating with a two-class stock structure is
that it heightens the issuer's vulnerability to a cheap takeover; an unwanted
suitor can gain, through the acquisition of the high vote stock, an undue
amount of influence for a relatively modest cost. In this case, however, the
parties have come up with a solution to this problem-such solution parallels
the strategy adopted by GartnerGroup in connection with its separation (also
preceded by a control gathering recapitalization) from IMS Health. Thus,
Florida East Coast, in connection with the alteration of its capital structure,
will adopt a charter amendment. The amendment will provide that a holder
oft percent of the high vote stock may only vote the amount thereof that is
proportionate to the holder's economic interest in Florida East Coast. The
I.R.S. is amenable to these anti-takeover devices-it does not view them as
an abrogation of the voting power shift caused by the recapitalization-and
while such an amendment will not conclusively prevent a takeover, it will
certainly go a long way towards interdicting an opportunistic one. Further,
LTR 200050017, issued to Waddell & Reed, strongly suggests that, even
though the preliminary recapitalization is supposed to effect, as indicated in
21 See I.R.C. S 355(b)(2)(D) (2000) and Rev. Ruls. 56-117 and 69-407.
See Rev. Rul. 69-126.
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Rev. Rul. 69-407, a permanent realignment of voting control, the two class
capital structure can, in fact, be collapsed with a degree of alacrity.
There, at the time of the spin-off, management represented that it
harbored no plan or intention to propose a change to the voting rights of
either class of stock. Nevertheless, less than two years after the spin-off, the
company proposed a second recapitalization-pursuant to which the high
vote stock would be converted into low-vote stock-because the company
had experienced unanticipated (but unspecified) problems from having two
classes of stock. The Service, without a great degree of difficulty, concluded
that this reverse recapitalization would not adversely affect the tax-free tenor
of the spin-off. Thus, it would appear that an arbitrage opportunity has been
created: An astute investor can identify the companies whose capital
structures, due to a prior spin-off, feature two classes of stock, and the
investor can then short the high priced class, secure in the knowledge that
the gap will be closed when, inevitably, the issuer petitions the I.R.S. for a
ruling regarding the benign nature of a reverse recapitalization.
G. I.R.S. Issues Proposed Regulations Under Section 355(e)
Historically, a corporation could effect a separation and acquisition, on
a tax-free basis, if the proper form for this integrated transaction was adhered
to. That proper form was known as the Morris Trust pattern and it entailed
a preliminary spin-off of the unwanted (from the acquirer's perspective)
assets followed by a merger of the target (which now possessed only the
wanted assets) into the acquirer in exchange solely for the acquirer's stock
and the latter's assumption of the target's liabilities. (If the merger
consideration did not consist solely of the acquirer's stock, the spin-off
would likely run afoul of the device test which is activated in cases where a
separation is coupled with a pre-arranged sale of all or a portion of the stock
of one of the corporate parties to the spin-off). 2 This reliable Morris Trust
pattern could always be used to accomplish, on a tax-free basis, a separation
and acquisition. However, in the mid-'90s, the pattern began to be abused
as the so-called monetizing Morris Trust transaction came to the fore. In a
monetizing Morris Trust transaction, (the first known example ofwhich was
Times Mirror's divestiture of its cable TV assets to Cox Cable), the target
would effect a preliminary borrowing ofan amount substantially equal to the
value of the wanted business; the loan proceeds would be conveyed to the
entity that would continue to conduct the unwanted business yet the
obligation to repay the borrowing would remain with the target and,
23 See Rev. Rul. 68-603, 1968-2 C.B. 148.
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effectively, be assumed by the acquirer as a result of the second step business
combination. Thus, the proceeds of the loan would be separated from the
obligation to defray it and this, in Congress' judgment, amounted to an
effective sale by the continuing entity of the wanted business to the acquirer;
such sale, however, was not recorded as such for tax purposes because it was
carried out under the auspices of the tax law's spin-off and reorganization
rules.
Congress reacted to this development by enacting, in 1997, Section
355(e). That section taxes the target, under Section 311 (b), with respect to
the gain it realizes on the distribution of the stock of the corporation
containing the unwanted business, whenever the spin-off transaction is
found to be part of a plan (or series of related transactions) pursuant to which
one or more persons acquire stock representing a 50 percent or greater
interest in either the distributing or distributed corporation. Moreover,
according to Section 355 (e) (2) (B), any such acquisition, occurringwithin the
four-year period beginning two years before the spin-off, is presumed to be
part of a plan including spin-offs. Thus, if a spin-off and acquisition are
found to be part of the requisite plan (or series of related transactions), and
the target shareholders do not emerge from the transactions with a greater
than 50 percent interest in the corporations then existing, the spin-offwill be
taxable, at the corporate level, since the distributed stock will, as a result,
forfeit its status as qualified property within the meaning ofSection 355(c) (2)
or, if the spin-off is part of a 'D' reorganization, Section 361(c)(2). The
classic Morris Trust transaction, in which a spin-off was, immediately,
followed by an acquisition, is, of course, no longer viable except in those rare
cases where the target shareholders emerge with in excess of 50 percent of
the stock of the acquirer. More difficult, however, is the case where a spin-
off occurs and, LATER, an acquisition takes place. If the events are regarded
as part of a plan, then penalties exacted by Section 355(e) will be imposed.
The proposed regulations (Prop. Reg. Section 1.355-7) attempt to define
the circumstances under which a prohibited plan will exist. Thus, a plan
exists if, and only if, the target, or the distributed subsidiary, or any of their
controlling shareholders (persons who own at least five percent of the stock
and who actively participate in the management or operation of the
corporation), INTENDED, on the date of the distribution, that the acquisition
or a similar acquisition occur in connection with the distribution.
Importantly, the un-communicated intentions of the acquirer are not
relevant; the only intentions that matter for this purpose are those harbored
by the distributing group and its controlling shareholders. The regulations
outline useful safe harbors. The satisfaction of these provisions means the
spin-off will not be burdened by the penalties of Section 355(e). One such
safe harbor operates in cases where: (1) the acquisition occurred more than
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six months after the distribution, (2) there was no agreement, understanding,
arrangement or substantial negotiations, concerning the acquisition, before
six months had elapsed following the distribution, and (3) the distribution
was motivated by a business purpose other than to facilitate an acquisition.
This safe harbor, however, is complicated by the fact that the regulations also
feature certain operating rules that can abrogate the avowed business purpose
for the separation. Thus, if at the time of the separation, it was reasonably
certain that, before six months had elapsed, an acquisition would occur, or
an agreement, understanding, arrangement or substantial negotiations would
take place; this reasonable certainty is evidence of a business purpose to
facilitate an acquisition. Therefore, the presence of reasonable certainty can
eliminate the efficacy of the safe harbor by casting aspersions on the
purported business for the separation. Accordingly, perhaps a more useful,
albeit arduous, safe harbor is the one that operates without regard to the
business purpose motivating the separation. This safe harbor applies in cases
where: (1) the acquisition occurs more than two years after the distribution
and (2) there was no agreement, understanding, arrangement or substantial
negotiations, concerning the acquisition, at the time of the distribution or
within six months thereafter.
Where the safe harbors do not apply, the regulations set forth a series of
factors tending to show that the distribution and acquisition are part of the
requisite plan. These factors focus on the presence of discussions between
the distributing group and the acquirer, or a potential acquirer, before the
spin-off, focusing on the time proximity between the steps. Did the
acquisition and distribution occur within six months of one another, or was
there an agreement regarding the second transaction within six months of the
first? Was the business purpose to motivate the distribution, or was it to
facilitate the acquisition or a similar acquisition?
The regulations, graciously, also set forth factors tending to show that the
distribution and acquisition were not part of the requisite plan. These non-
plan factors include the absence of discussions (between the distributing
group and the acquirer or a potential acquirer before the separation), the
presence of a pure business purpose for the separation; the distribution was
NOT motivated by a purpose to facilitate the acquisition or a similar
acquisition, a showing that the second step acquisition was motivated by an
identifiable, unexpected change in market or business conditions or a
showing that the separation would have occurred at approximately the same
time, and in similar form, regardless of the acquisition or a similar
acquisition.
These regulations will only apply to distributions occurring after the date
they are published in the Federal Register as final regulations. Oddly,
current law in this area seems to be liberal than the proposed regulations.
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Thus, in LTR 200104024, a spin-off and acquisition did not run afoul of
Section 355(e) EVEN THOUGH there had been, prior to such spin-off,
discussions (not rising to the level of an agreement), regarding the
acquisition, between the acquirer and a controlling shareholder of the
distributing corporation. In this case, the distribution WAS motivated by a
pure business purpose-a purpose to achieve significant cost savings-r'ather
than a purpose to facilitate an acquisition and this fact, notwithstanding the
preliminary discussions, may have tipped the scales. In any event, with
respect to transactions taking place during this interregnum, prior to the
finalization of the proposed regulations (which we expect will take place
sometime early in 2002), it would be wise to adhere, to the extent possible,
to their tenets. After all, the proposed regulations reflect the I.R.S.'s
considered views on when a prohibited plan exists and the agency can be
expected, albeit unofficially, to evaluate most cases according to the dictates
of the proposed regulations.

